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Abstract True Random Number Generators have many uses,
in particular they play a key role in security applications and
cryptographic algorithms. Our interest lies in the quality of
their generated random numbers. More specifically, for such
utilizations, a slight deviation of the numbers from a “per-
fect” behavior can have disastrous consequences. It is then
necessary to devise schemes for the testing of these genera-
tors in order to detect non-random properties of their num-
bers. Moreover, one should consider them from an attacker
point of view and use any means to try to perturbate their
good functionnality. In this article we describe such exper-
iments and several standard statistical tools for the genera-
tors testing. We also present experimental results obtained
through the study of a generator embedded in a processor in
order to illustrate our methodology. We show that its pertu-
bation leads to the apparition of dangerous deviations in its
numbers distribution.
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1 Introduction
Random numbers have proved useful in many fields of ap-
plication. An obvious one and certainly the most popular
is gaming, which comprises lotteries, card games or slot
machines. From a scientific point of view, random num-
bers have permitted much improvement in the comprehen-
sion and prevention of natural phenomena such as seisms,
weather forecast or crowd psychology. This was made pos-
sible by their utilization in numerical simulation and Monte
Carlo methods [13], by replacing parameters at the input of
models of physical phenomena and knowing their distribu-
tion laws. Random numbers also have important functions
in the domain of security application and more particularly
in cryptography. Indeed, secure functions require random
numbers to be employed in many different ways, for exam-
ple to generate keys, signatures, nonces or countermeasures.
The aim of Random Number Generators (RNGs) is to
produce numbers with properties similar to random ones,
which means that they must be independent and identically
distributed. The desired distribution is determined by the ap-
plication into which the RNG is used. For instance the sim-
ulation of a physical processes can require the random num-
bers to follow a Poisson or Gaussian distributions, while
it is more probable that uniform numbers will be manipu-
lated in cryptography. Furthermore, the very nature of se-
curity applications underlines the importance that the ran-
dom number should never deviate from their ideal distribu-
tion. Random numbers with bad properties can disable secu-
rity measures against potential attacks by invalidating secu-
rity proofs of cryptographic algorithms or disabling counter-
measures, leading to disastrous consequences as illustrated
in [10,6,23,16]. Moreover, as a core brick of cryptographic
implementations, RNGs are likely to be targeted by attack-
ers. In consequence, it is indispensable to study the effect of
external perturbations on RNGs in order to determine their
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robustness and suitability for such application and prevent
possible flaws in their design.
RNGs are composed of two main families, the True Ran-
dom Number Generators (TRNGs) and the Pseudo Random
Number Generators (PRNGs). TRNGs exploit physical phe-
nomena that contain a part of incertitude. PRNGs are based
on deterministic algorithms. For security applications, there
exist recommendations for the design and the evaluation of
RNGs, in particular PRNGs [32,2,34,18,1].
This paper presents a methodology for the testing of
TRNGs under physical perturbations. It explains the differ-
ent set ups proposed in order to achieve it as well as the
means to analyze consequential defects in the sequences of
random numbers generated. Also, one TRNG is tested and
the results are presented. In the literature, similar studies
have been realized: the randomness source perturbations are
mostly achieved via variations of their power supply volt-
age, temperature or the injection of a frequency. These per-
turbations and their effects can be modelized and analyzed
from a mathematical point of view [12,39,3], but more of-
ten studies focus on their observation from real implemen-
tations. For instance, TRNGs implemented in commercial-
ized components like Infineon chip card controllers or Via
C3 processors have been tested with modifications of their
temperature, clock frequency, power supply voltage and ac-
tivity [7,5]. In these cases, a very slight or no influence at all
were observed in the TRNGs performances. Many studies
of TRNGs under stress are done with modifications of the
temperature as it is easily done and often yields interesting
results [33,48,36,38]. In particular, TRNGs designs based
on oscillators have shown to be sensible to different temper-
atures, with ensuing modifications of their frequency. A sim-
ilar result was obtained with variations of the power supply
voltage in [48]. A different kind of perturbation is explained
in [33] with the application of neighboring activities to three
different TRNGs and the comparison of their performances.
Depending on the TRNG design it is shown that there can
be a decrease in its performances or not at all. Finally, a
perturbation that was introduced recently is the frequency
injection [25,31]. It can be realized by two different means,
either directly through the circuit power supply or with elec-
tromagnetic (EM) waves. The first experience shows that it
is possible for free-running oscillators to lock their phase
and thus to considerably reduce the entropy of the TRNG. In
the second set up, a free-running oscillator has its frequency
varying depending on the injected EM signal.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the con-
cept of RNG is detailed. In Section 3, the experimental set
up for TRNG perturbations is explained, with a description
of the different test benches. In Section 4, the tests used to
determine the level of randomness produced by the TRNGs
are presented. In Section 5, results of experiences are com-
mented.
2 Random Number Generators
As described previously, RNGs can be divided in two main
families and mixed designs. In practice RNGs are embed-
ded in electronic circuits, where often only a small space on
silicon can be allocated to them, for example in smart cards.
Furthermore, it is necessary for some applications that their
output rate be important enough while keeping good ran-
dom properties. These requirement can limit the choice of














Fig. 1 RNG conception principle
A TRNG is constituted by a source of physical noise
that is sampled and digitized. This noise can be found dur-
ing the process of radioactive decay [46], in the thermal
noise created by flow of electrons [30,42] or in the oscil-
lators phase jitter generated by different propagation times
in logic gates [17,39]. The entropy source produces a digi-
talized analog noise (DAS) that is then post-processed. In-
deed, the entropy source covers the need for randomness but
it often produces numbers that show some deviation from
their ideal properties. A whitening function is then necessary
to ensure that these undesirable properties are suppressed.
Such functions can be very simple like the von Neumann
corrector [29] and correct only minor defects. More com-
plicated post-processors like resilient or cryptographic func-
tions can be also used with more efficiency. Sometimes, many
TRNGs can be used for the same application, in which case
their output is combined in an entropy pool. This permit to
avoid consequences of the collapse or deficiencies of one of
them.
A PRNG has only a processing function which consists
in the digital computation of a value depending on some
deterministic algorithm. The typical used algorithms com-
prise linear congruential generators [22] and Linear Feed-
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back Shift Register (LFSRs) [35], but also cryptographic al-
gorithms [28]. PRNGs are often seeded by TRNGs, in which
case they are also used to improve the bit rate at the output.
3 Test benches
In the introduction we presented existing means for stress-
ing TRNGs. This section explains the implementations of
our set ups for four different kinds of perturbation. As the
TRNGs are usually not independent pieces of circuits we
consider the components into which they are embedded, like
chips for instance.
3.1 Perturbation by the application of a temperature
The aim of this experience is to immerse the studied com-
ponents in an environment having a certain temperature. We
developed three set ups allowing us to heat them up and cool
them down.
3.1.1 Principle
Figure 2 describes the general principle of the test benches.
A PC monitors the applied temperature and dialogs with the
tested component. The component is introduced in the envi-




Environment with a fixed temperature
Fig. 2 Principle of a perturbation by the application of different tem-
peratures
3.1.2 Resistor heater
Depending on the current flowing through a resistor heater,
it will deliver a certain power dissipated by Joule effect. The
resistor is maintained against a hook, as represented in Fig-
ure 3, and the heat given off by the former is propagated
through the later. The hook is made of aluminium to im-
prove the heat propagation. By fixing the tested component
against or inside the hook, it will also heat up and remain
stable at a certain temperature between the room tempera-
ture and 150 ◦C.
Fig. 3 A resistor heater is maintained against a hook and heating it up
3.1.3 Peltier Cooler
Peltier coolers exploit the Peltier effect [14]: depending on
the direction of the current flowing through two different
semi-conductor materials, a heat absorption or emission hap-
pens at their junction. The cooler is constituted of many of
these thermocouples interconnected between two ceramic
plates. In practice it means that one face of the Peltier cooler
absorbs heat (cold face) and the other releases it (hot face).
Depending on the current flowing through the cooler and the
voltage applied, a certain difference of temperature appears
between the two faces. In order to minimize the temperature
on the cold face, a heat sink combined with a fan is main-
tained against the hot face with some thermal grease and
evacuates the heat. A temperature between room tempera-
ture and -30 ◦C can thus be obtained on the cold face. The
tested component is placed on the cold face as represented
in Figure 4.
It is sometimes desirable to have the experience last a
few hours. In this case frost will form on the cold face sur-
face and the component, maintaining the temperature at about
0 ◦C. In order to avoid such a phenomenon, the set up needs
to be moved in a vacuum environment.
3.1.4 Liquid nitrogen
Colder temperatures are obtained with the use of liquid ni-
trogen. Liquid nitrogen has a temperature of -196 ◦C and de-
pending on how far the tested component is from the liquid
source, amid the nitrogen vapors, it can be cooled down to
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Fig. 4 Temperature down to -30 ◦C are obtained by the combination of
a Peltier cooler and a heat sink
this temperature. The liquid nitrogen is contained in a De-
war flask which provides thermal insulation and slows the
evaporation down. Depending on the component size, it may
or may not be possible to introduce it into the flask. If it is
small enough, the component is fixated to a rod introduced
in the flask as represented in Figure 5. The temperature is
set by adjusting the height of the rod. On the contrary, if the
component is too big to be introduced in the flask, a rod is
put entirely into it. The component is maintained on its ex-
tremity, just outside the flask. The rod is made of aluminum
and thus dissipates the heat from the component, cooling it
down.
Fig. 5 Cold temperatures are obtained through the use of liquid nitro-
gen and a rod
Though very cold temperatures can be attained through
this process, a few drawbacks restrict its use. The nitrogen
cannot be maintained indefinitely in the Dewar flask even
though it reduces its evaporation. Moreover, the thermaliza-
tion is long and the temperature is sensible to the rod move-
ments. However, once the temperature is stabilized it will
remain so for several hours.
Let’s notice that silicon components are sensible to cold
temperature [40]. When the temperature falls down, the elec-
trons density decreases until it reaches a state called “freeze-
out”. At this stage, at approximately -150 ◦C, there are not
enough electrons to make the component work.
3.2 Perturbation by a laser source
Laser sources were first used to reproduce the effects caused
by ionizing radiations on semiconductors [15,27]. For in-
stance, it was shown that an exposition to a flash could in-
duce an error on the illuminated logic gates [37]. Accord-
ingly, laser beams are often used to operate faults attacks
on electronic circuits by focusing on interesting spots. Laser
beams send photons that permit the formation of electron-
hole pairs when in the neighborhood of polarized zones.
These pairs create currents that disturb the normal behavior
of a circuit. Figure 6 describes the set-up that exploits laser
beams. A laser diode produces a beam focalized on a 30µm
diameter with a maximum power of 3.75W. A PC moni-
tors the laser and a XY table that moves the beam above the
component in order to impact different spots.
PC




Fig. 6 Principle of the perturbation using a laser source
It is necessary to prepare the component beforehand to
improve the attack. A thinning of the silicon substrate is
performed with a milling machine. This operation reduces
transmission losses in the substrate, thus increasing the power
in the active zone.
3.3 Perturbation via an electromagnetic injection
Electromagnetic perturbation is a very important issue with
respect to electronic circuits. These circuits are sensible to
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electromagnetic waves and must be protected from them
(hence the electromagnetic compatibility laws). The task is
complicated by the fact that electronic circuits are them-
selves generators of electromagnetic waves. These waves
are created either by the current flow through a loop or by
a voltage drop inside a circuit. The components from which
the waves are produced are called antennas.
The perturbations induced on circuits are due to their
coupling with the emitted radiation. The coupling is made
possible via the circuits antennas or directly on its wires
and many different effects can be observed depending on the
perturbed components. In [8] the effects of electromagnetic
waves on electronic circuits are presented. For instance they
can lead to signals perturbation with modification of a logi-
cal state, delays that desynchronize signals or the frequency
and phase jitter variations of oscillating systems.
We present our set up for a perturbation via electromag-
netic radiations on Figure 7. The electromagnetic perturba-
tion is generated with a probe constituted by a rod and a
loop at its extremity. A sinusoidal signal, whose power is
amplified up to 2W, goes through the loop and creates an
electromagnetic field. The probe is placed above the tested
component, with an XY table allowing the shifting of its lo-
cation so that cartographies can be obtained. A PC pilots the









Fig. 7 Perturbation via electromagnetic radiations
3.4 Perturbation via ionizing radiations
A beam is said to be ionizing if the energy it transfers to
electrons is important enough to liberate them from their
atoms. High energy radiations can even modify a material
crystalline lattice and its electronic properties [4].
Ionizing radiations are found in different ways as ex-
plained in [43]. They comprise :
– cosmic rays produced by subatomic particles from the
outer space,
– high energy electromagnetic waves generated by the in-
teraction of electrons beams with a metal (X-rays) or
emitted during atomic nuclei decay (γ rays),
– α and β rays emitted during a radioactive decay,
– neutron radiations produced by the interaction of neu-
trons with a material.
Studies have shown that ionizing radiations can cause
faults on electronic components. Consequences of such ef-
fects can be very important, in particular for spatial appli-
cations with the impact of cosmic rays but also in the elec-
tronic domain. References on studies of the effects induced
by such radiations are introduced in [41].
We present two test benches that we used with regards to
ionizing radiations, one exploits γ rays and the other X-rays.
3.4.1 Gamma rays
Four different radioactive sources were used. Each one is
characterized by its energy level (in electron-volts) and its
activity (number of disintegration per second in Becquerels)
depending on the material quantity:
– Americium 241, 60keV, 3.7MBq
– Americium 241, 60keV, 518MBq
– Barium 133, 356keV, 2.5MBq
– Cesium 137, 660keV, 26MBq
The experiment set up consists in putting the sources the
closest to the tested component. Three sources are incorpo-
rated into plastic discs (Figure 8a), the Cesium is contained















Fig. 8 Perturbation via radioactive sources
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3.4.2 X-rays
A X-ray generator is constituted by a high voltage trans-
former supplying a X-ray tube. A current is created between
two electrodes when applying a high voltage. Electrons from
the cathode impact the anode material. The effect is to en-
ergize the material electrons and the consequent emission
of a X-radiation. This radiation is characterized by its inten-
sity (proportional to the generated current) and its energy (in
electron-volts, it is fixed by the chosen voltage).
Figure 9 describes the set up for tests with X-rays. The
electronic circuit is placed so that the component is perpen-













Fig. 9 Perturbations via a X-rays
4 Statistical tests
The precise evaluation of RNGs is a difficult task as dis-
cussed in [13,9]. From a mathematical viewpoint, we as-
sume the output sequence of the RNGs to be independent
and identically distributed (IID), which means that each ran-
dom variable has the same probability distribution as the
others and all are mutually independent (with respect to a
given probability distribution). Such assumption is almost
impossible to prove in practice. However, the primary goal
is to show that the RNG has no known bias which is differ-
ent than proving formal property of the sequence generated.
For this purpose, we use statistical tests in order to evaluate
how far the RNG is from an IID. During the perturbation of a
TRNG we save the random numbers it outputs. By examin-
ing those numbers, we can determine if the TRNG has been
affected by the perturbation or not. This decision, however,
is not easily done as the RNG output is not reproducible and
there does not exist a universal test of randomness. In prac-
tice we test if the number distribution does not stray too far
from a theoretical distribution of true random numbers (in-
dependent uniformly distributed). This means that we must
verify the key properties that characterize non-random num-
bers. Obviously there is no end to non-random properties
that we can think of, therefore we use different batteries of
statistical tests that incorporate a few of them.
Some people tried to describe tests that should be used
with random numbers [28,19] and we present batteries that
are now commonly applied to assess the performance of
RNGs.
4.1 Principle
Each statistical test verify an hypothesisH0 about the tested
sequence of numbers.H0 is the assertion that the sequence
is random. Depending on the issue of the test, this hypothesis
is accepted or rejected.
For each test a statistic is chosen and its theoretical dis-
tribution is computed. A critical value is determined from
the distribution, where the probability of this value happen-
ing is small. The statistic is calculated during the test and if
it exceeds this value thenH0 is rejected, else it is accepted.
This reflects the fact that a sequence of true random numbers
should not have a distribution too different of its theoretical
one, so there is a small probability of this value happening.
In reality the statistic will exceed the critical value a cer-
tain number of times and H0 will be rejected although the
sequence may really be random. This event is called a Type
I error and its probability is α . On the contrary, the proba-
bility of accepting H0 though the sequence is not random
is β and this event is called a Type II error. The value of α
can be determined by the application for which the TRNG is
used. The greater α , the more chance there is to reject a se-
quence of numbers and so the harder it is to pass the test. For
example, if α = 0.001 then one sequence out of one thou-
sand will be rejected. Typical values of α lie in the interval
[0.001,0.05]. β is not fixed because each test verifies only
one property of the sequence of numbers and consequently
an infinite number of non-random sequences could pass the
test.
A drawback of this method is the lack of concrete infor-
mation that results from the acceptance or rejection of H0.
More knowledge on their performance can be acquired by
observing directly some of their properties, for instance by
representing the number distribution. Additionnaly, TRNGs
are evolving in time and this should also be taken into ac-
count. We will illustrate the interest of such analysis in sec-
tion 5.
As all combinations of random numbers are equally prob-
ables, the statistical tests basically focus on the detection of
pattern repetition. This begs the problem of localized short
faults that could be induced by attackers. Indeed, this kind
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of event would not be detected during statistical testing. Un-
fortunately, from a cryptographic point of view their occur-
rence could be sufficient to retrieve sensitive informations.
Consequently, one should not always consider it safe to use
a TRNG that produces sequences passing the tests. In real-
ity, their relevance strongly depends on the context of the
TRNG study.
4.2 The ENT program
ENT [47] computes five basic values that allow us to have a
first insight in the properties of the tested sequence of num-
bers. Those values are the entropy, the chi2, pi , the mean and
the correlation. It can show biases in the distribution of the
numbers and correlations.
4.3 The FIPS PUB 140-2 standard
The Federal Information Processing Standards PUBlication
140-2 [11] describes a standard for the accreditation of cryp-
tographic modules. Introduced by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), it presents four simple
tests that can quickly point out defaults in the tested se-
quence of numbers.
The sequence is considered as a succession of bits. The
monobit test computes the number of zeros and ones in the
sequence. The poker test compares the number of four bit
patterns in the sequence with their theoretical probabilities
of occurrence. The run test calculates the number of n-bit
runs (succession of n bits having the same value). The long
run test computes the number of runs with more than 25
successive bits.
The sequence produced by a TRNG is divided in 20000
bit subsequences. Each test is applied to every of these sub-
sequences. The result must belong to a certain interval given
by the standard for each test to pass. We finally consider the
percentage of sub-sequences whose tests have passed.
4.4 The AIS31 methodology
The Bundersamt für Sicherheit der Informationstechnik (BSI)
is the German institution for information security. They have
written an evaluation methodology and functionnality classes
for RNGs depending on their design and applications [18].
They have pre-defined three classes for typical use cases
of TRNGs, for which the following requirements must be
met:
– the random numbers might be used for cryptographic
applications but they do not need to be unpredictable
(PTG.1),
– the random numbers have a high entropy but they could
be distinguishable from independent uniformly distributed
ones (PTG.2),
– the random numbers are suitable for any cryptographic
applications and they must not show any bias or correla-
tion (PTG.3).
They created two procedures to be part of a RNG eval-
uation process. They use nine statistical tests, four of which
are those of the standard FIPS 140-2. The first procedure
evaluates the inconspicuousness of random numbers, which
means that it detects if parts of the tested sequenced behave
differently from others. The second procedure ensures that
the entropy is large enough.
4.5 The Diehard battery
This battery contains several tests [26]. The studied sequence
of numbers is considered as a succession of 32 bit integers.
For each test a random variable X is chosen with a distribu-
tion F . The tests return p-values p given by :
p= 1−F(X) (1)
For a sequence of true random numbers the p-values
should be uniformly distributed in [0,1[. As F is only an
approximation of the theoretical distribution of X then some
deviations should appear. Most of them will be found at the
distribution tails where the p-values are equal to 0 or 1. How-
ever such values should be expected from time to time. Con-
sequently, the sequence is deemed not random if more than
five of these values, within some bounds, are computed. For
instance with an interval of 0.01 we expect getting p-values
belonging to [0.01,0.099].
4.6 The NIST test suite
This battery was developed by the NIST, its goal being the
evaluation of RNGs used in cryptographic applications [32].
The sequences are tested with respect to the following prop-
erties :
– uniformity (the occurrence probability of bits to zero or
one are equals to 0.5 in any part of the sequence),
– scalability (every randomly extracted subsequence should
be proved as random as the original sequence),
– consistency (a RNGs should be tested from several of its
outcomes and not only one).
Each statistical test results in a p-value p. This value is
the probability that a true random number generator pro-
duces a sequence less random than the tested RNG with re-
gards to a certain property. A p-value equals to 1 means that
the sequence is perfectly random and 0 that it is not at all.
Therefore H0 is accepted if p ≥ α with α ∈ [0.001,0.01].
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For example, a p-value p≥ 0.01 signifies that the tested se-
quence is random with a probability of 99.99%.
In practice the sequence is divided in subsequences of
at least 1000 bits and each of them generates a p-value for
every test. The proportion of p-values greater than α is com-
puted and must belong to the following interval for the se-






where pˆ= 1−α and m is the subsequence number.
The p-value distribution is also examined in order to ver-








where [0,1] is divided in 10 intervals, Fi is the number of p-
values in the interval i and s is the number of subsequences
in i. A new p-value is computed from this data with :
p-valueT = igamc(9/2,χ2/2)









where igamc is the incomplete gamma function and Γ is
the gamma function. If p-valueT ≥ 0.0001 then the subse-
quences are considered uniformly distributed.
4.7 The TestU01 library
TestU01 [21] contains several batteries of statistical tests. In
TestU01 the sequence of bits can alternatively be considered
as a succession of real values in (0,1). In consequence, the
hypothesisH0 can be divided as follows :
– the tested sequence is a succession of independent and
uniformly distributed reals in (0,1) (H A0 ),
– the tested sequence is a succession of independent bits
taking values of zero and one with the same probability
(H B0 ).
The tests included in the batteries are written so that they
can verify eitherH A0 orH
B
0 .
When a sequence of reals is considered then for each test
the following p-value is computed :
p= P[Y ≥ y|H0] (5)
where y is the realization of the test statistic Y . For some
tests, p is considered as a uniformity measure, that is if p
is close to 1 then the tested RNG is considered producing
values with excessive uniformity while it is the opposite if
p is close to 0. If p is very small then the test is failed but
if there is a doubt on whether it is too small then the test
must be repeated with another sequence until a clear answer
is obtained.
In the case a sequence of bits is tested instead of reals
then a right and a left p-value are calculated and the se-
quence is rejected if either of them is close to 0 :
pR = P[Y ≥ y|H0]
pL = P[Y ≤ y|H0] (6)
5 Experimental results
In this section we present the results of perturbation experi-
mentations on a TRNG implanted in a Via Nano processor.
We have realised previous studies of TRNGs embedded in
smart cards with temperature variations [38]. Our aim is to
investigate whether this kind of component is also sensitive
to such a perturbation and to realise a more thorough study
with other means of disturbance.
In practice we use the Via EITX-3000 motherboard into
which the processor is embedded. The processor is running
Linux 2.6.32 and APIs developped by VIA [45] allow us to
access the TRNG output. We remotely control the processor
via a SSH connexion to a PC.
As specified in the documentation [44], two sources of
random bits can be chosen. The first one is the direct out-
put of the entropy source which consists in a combination
of oscillators. The second one is the bit sequences produced
by the entropy source that have been post-processed with a
AES. As we want to observe perturbation effects on the en-
tropy source, we must examine the random bits it generates.
In consequence we apply the test batteries described prece-
dently. For TestU01 we use two of them, Alphabit and Rab-
bit having respectively 9 and 26 tests, as the others need at
least 3600MB random numbers to work and the acquisition
time would be too long.
5.1 Design of the entropy source
The TRNG is based on classical designs using ring oscil-
lators (loops composed of an odd number of “not” gates).
Their principle is the sampling of a high frequency oscilla-
tor by one with a slower frequency [17,7,20,24].
The TRNG of the Via Nano processor is realized as de-
scribed in Figure 10 [5]. Three independently free-running
ring oscillators work in parallel and a bias voltage generator
adjusts their frequencies between 450-810MHz. Oscillators
2 and 3 have their frequencies divided by 8 and the resulting
oscillating signals are combined through a XOR operation.
The XOR output is used to control the frequency of oscil-
lator 4 along with the bias generator. Oscillator 4 is said to
have a frequency between 20 and 68MHz. Finally, oscilla-
tor 4 samples oscillator 1 through a flip-flop and this process
generates a sequence of bits.



















Fig. 10 Design of the studied TRNG entropy source
5.2 Temperature perturbation
This experience consists in heating and cooling the proces-
sor and through it the TRNG. As the processor is embedded
in a motherboard, itself fitted with a heatsink, it is difficult to
access. Fortunately, the processor heats itself when process-
ing information. Therefore, by removing the heatsink and
using instead a fan we could attain up to 100 ◦C before it
ceased working. For small temperatures we directly used the
set up with the liquid nitrogen where the rod is completely
inserted into the Dewar flask and the processor is maintained
at its extremity. The processor was thus cooled down to 0 ◦C
at most.
For different temperatures between 0-100◦C we analyzed
random number sequences of 100MB produced by the gen-
erator. In normal conditions (at about 36 ◦C with the heatsink),
the entropy source has poor performances as a bias occurs
naturally. Therefore, our aim is to observe a deviation from
this state rather than the apparition of a defect.
Figure 11 presents the results of statistical tests. Data
from FIPS, Diehard, NIST and TestU01 tests give the per-
centage of failures at each tested temperature. In this case,
the hotter the temperature, the bigger the deviation from true
random numbers and vice-versa. With an augmentation of
the temperature appears an increase of the bias in the bit
distribution as well as more important correlations.
Figures 12a and 12c show the error in the distributions of
1-byte and 2-bytes words and its evolution with the temper-
ature. In theory the words should be uniformly distributed.





where i is the considered word, Fi is its percentage of ap-
paritions and Ni is its theoretical number of apparitions.
At 0 ◦C the words approximately follow a uniform distri-
bution. Deviations appear whith the increasing temperature
and more particularly at 100◦C. This effect is also observed
on Figures 12b and 12d with the word Hamming weights
(the number of bits to 1 in a word). Words with the smallest
and biggest Hamming weights are those happening the most




























Fig. 11 Results of the statistical test with a temperature perturbation
This study allows us to understand the real effect behind
the evolution of the statistical test performances.
5.3 Laser perturbation
In this experiment we want to impact the TRNG embedded
in the processor with a laser beam. However, the available
documentation does not indicate the TRNG precise loca-
tion on the die. We decided to sweep the entire processor
by small increments, shooting the laser at each position for
a few seconds while a sequence of random numbers is gener-
ated. Finally, each sequence of random numbers is analyzed
and we build cartographies of the processor that represent
the test results.
For better performances of the perturbation, we men-
tioned that a layer of silicon should be removed from the
component. During this step 570µm of silicon were removed
from the die initial thickness of 900µm. Then the surface
was polished to avoid an odd behavior of the laser beam at
the impact, thinning the component further down by 80µm.
The size of the random number acquisitions was deter-
mined by two factors:
– the whole processor (die size of 7.65mm by 8.275mm)
is sweeped,
– the laser shot must last only a few seconds to avoid irre-
versible damage.
Consequently we decided on acquisitions of 4MB bytes at
each location. Furthermore, in order to get an overview of
the experiment results we used the ENT program. Other test
batteries would compute statistics relatively to an hypothesis
H0 whereas ENT gives values that caraterize a sequence
properties which is more interesting in this case. For every
value of the program we create a processor cartography.
Figure 13a shows a photography of the processor and
its different components. Figure 13b presents a cartography
on the value of the source entropy when considering bytes.
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(a) 1-byte words distribution (b) 1-byte words distribution depending on their Hamming weight
(c) 2-bytes words distribution (d) 2-bytes words distribution depending on their Hamming weight
Fig. 12 Words distribution for the TRNG with variations of temperature
This was obtained with steps of 50µm and laser beam with a
power of 1.05W. The entropy measures the quantity of un-
known information on the source output so that the smaller
it is, the less random the numbers. If we consider the TRNG
as a source X of n-bits random words then the entropy is






where Pi is the occurrence probability of word i.
In Figure 13b, the black pixels show the location where
a laser shot made the processor crash. They mostly corre-
spond to cache emplacements where the program or the cre-
ated data are stored. An interesting phenomenon is produced
in the upper right corner of the processor where a ring ap-
pears with smaller values of the entropy. A cartography of
this location (Figure 13c) was realized with a laser beam of
greater power (3.75W) and smaller steps (30µm). It throws
some more details into relief, in particular, a small zone with
a bigger loss of entropy becomes visible near the upper edge
of the processor.
A further study of this interesting zone is realised in Sec-
tion 5.6.
5.4 Perturbation with radioactive sources
We tested the reaction of the TRNG when subjected to the
presence of radioactive sources as presented in Section 3.4.1.
For each source several sequences of 100MB were acquired
and analysed. Figure 14 resumes results of the statistical
tests. Am1 refers to the Americium source with an activity
of 3.7MBq and Am2 an activity of 518MBq. We do not ob-
serve any variations in the test results that would be mean-
ingful about the source used and they are very similar to
those without perturbation of the TRNG. This could be due
to the fact that the sources activity is too low and the number
of created electron-hole pairs not important enough to really
disturb the TRNG.
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(c) The entropy locally takes different values from the rest of the processor
Fig. 13 Representations of the Via Nano processor
5.5 Perturbation by X-rays
In this experiment the TRNG was impacted by X-rays as de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2. Four configurations were tested and
several random number sequences of 100MB were acquired
for each:
– the distance between the processor and the X-ray tube is
65cm and its settings are 140kV and 21mA (1),
– the distance between the processor and the X-ray tube is
65cm and its settings are 70kV and 40mA (2),
– the distance between the processor and the X-ray tube is
25cm and its settings are 70kV and 40mA (3),
– the distance between the processor and the X-ray tube is
25cm and its settings are 160kV and 18.75mA (4).
In configuration 4, the processor crashed some time after
the beginning of the experiment. This can be explained by
the fact that the processor receives radiations on its whole
surface and all its functionnalities are impacted.
Figure 15 gives the results of the statistical tests. Config-
uration 0 refers to the case without perturbation. The results




























Fig. 14 Results of the statistical test with different radioactive sources
are similar for all configurations which implies that there




























Fig. 15 Results of the statistical test with configurations of the test
bench
5.6 Combination of laser and temperature perturbation
Only the experiences with temperature variations and laser
shots gave interesting results. We decided to experiment with
the two perturbations in the meantime by observing effects
on the interesting zone that was localized with laser shots.
In addition to the laser perturbation on one point of this
zone we let the processor temperature go up to 90 ◦C. As
the combined effect of a laser shot and the temperature in-
crease is near enough to crash the processor, we acquired
several sequences of random numbers intersected by some
waiting time. Between each acquisition the processor gets
back to its normal state.
The previously used test of entropy on bytes reflects the
deviation in the byte distribution from its theoretical uni-
form distribution. Every sequence of random numbers is di-
vided in 10 sequential blocks of data, each one consisting
of 400MB. We compute the numbers distribution for each
part of the sequences which gives us a progression of this
information during a laser shot. We show in Figure 16 that
this deviation not only depends on the perturbation but also
evolves in time from the beginning of a laser shot. The figure
presents the error on 1-byte and 2-bytes words distributions
with and without the perturbations.
Figures 16a and 16c show that the word distributions
have deviations which means that the TRNG is not perfect
even in its normal behavior. These deviations represent a
pattern that is stable through time. By comparison, the same
study with a perturbed TRNG yields a different and chang-
ing pattern as exposed in Figures 16b and 16d. The tendency
of this evolution is toward a steep increase of a few error val-
ues. At the beginning of the perturbations, the results already
show more important deviations. By the end of the laser shot
(after approximately 4-5 seconds), some words have much
bigger probabilities of apparition which defeats the TRNG
purpose.
Figure 17 represents the word distribution as a function
of their Hamming weight. Here again an interesting phe-
nomenon can be observed that explains in more details our
previous observations. It shows the evolution of the occur-
rence probability of the words with the smaller and bigger
Hamming weight from the least to most likely.
In consequence, a few words have much bigger proba-
bilities of apparition. This kind of result is exploited in brute
force attacks. Instead of trying all possible words combina-
tions, the search is reduced by the knowledge of the words
the most likely to happen.
6 Conclusion
In this article we explained different means for the pertur-
bation of TRNGs and statistical tests that should be used in
order to detect defects in the random numbers generation.
We presented results of such a study on a TRNG embed-
ded in a Via Nano processor. Four test benches were oper-
ated. The first one with temperature variation is very simple
to set up and often yields a bias in the distribution of ran-
dom numbers. In this case we showed that the hotter the
temperature, the greater the deviation and vice-versa. The
second test bench exploits a laser that is more difficult to
set up. However, interesting effects could also be observed
with this configuration. The generation of cartographies of
the processor with different laser diode powers brought out
positions where there was an influence on the TRNG. This
was observed with a loss of entropy in these zones. The ex-
periments with radioactive sources and X-rays did not show
a perturbation of the TRNG behavior. The last experiment,
by mixing the application of a hot temperature and laser
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(a) 1-byte words distribution with the processor in a normal state (b) 1-byte words distribution with the perturbations
(c) 2-bytes words distribution with the processor in a normal state (d) 2-bytes words distribution with the perturbations
Fig. 16 Words distribution for the TRNG with and without perturbations
shots, allowed us to apply a bigger perturbation knowing
that separately deviations were observed. Studies of the gen-
erated random numbers as 8 and 16-bits words showed bi-
ases with substantial amplitudes in their distribution. Also,
they yielded information about the evolution of this bias in
time during a perturbation.
This work points out the very obvious need to study the
reaction of TRNGs to perturbations. Indeed, cryptographic
post-processing may be able to suppress defects in the gen-
erated sequences of random numbers but their utilization is
not always compulsory. It is then necessary to create some
kind of countermeasures against perturbations, independantly
to the post-processing involved. Not only should TRNGs
be subjected to some kind of stress but different type of
perturbations should be used as there is no assurance they
should have only one weakness. Furthermore, in addition
to showing losses in TRNG performances, such studies can
and should help to design robust circuits suitable for even
most critical applications in term of security. As even simple
and easy to set up experiments can show interesting results,
there is no reason as to why such a step should be bypassed.
For some TRNG utilizations, this verification is mandatory
and this article presents tools to monitor their performance.
Finally, we highlighted problems concerning the choice of
the statistical tests. Though they show tendencies in TRNG
performances, it is not always clear how it reflects on the
generated numbers. Moreover, it is best to use several bat-
teries in order to get the best possible knowledge of TRNG.
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